%0 Conference Paper
%B Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
%D 2013
%T Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy
%A Yiling Chen
%A Stephen Chong
%A Ian A. Kash
%A Tal Moran
%A Salil Vadhan
%X Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modelling privacy in players' utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome o has the property that any report of player i would have led to o with approximately the same probability, then o has small privacy cost to player i. We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number n of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of n).
%B Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
%I ACM
%C Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
%P 215-232
%@ 978-1-4503-1962-1
%G eng
%U http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2482540.2482549
%1 2482549
%R 10.1145/2482540.2482549